Introduction
In eGovernment, different administrations communicate with each other to exchange personal information of citizens within the context of a particular process of which the citizen is the subject. Several levels of government can be involved in the execution of a process, which makes tracking a process a difficult task. Also, the structure of a process may not be known in advance; looking up certain data of a given citizen may spawn sub-processes that cannot be anticipated ahead of time.
When a process is started for a citizen, it is desirable that the status of that process can be checked at any given * This work was supported in part by the Concerted Research Action time. In that case, we want to avoid going over the entire process tree again, to question all involved governmental institutions. Keeping secure logfiles is considered to be a fair practise to comply to legislation regarding the processing of personal data, and this also holds for these institutions. In this paper, we propose to reconstruct the process from these logged events, and to make it possible to outsource the logging functionality. Moreover, we would like to avoid that a logging server administrator or several colluding administrators are able to reconstruct processes from logged events.
Therefore, we designed a logging model in which the privacy of the subject of the processes is protected maximally, while accessing the logged events is still possible by authorised persons. The storage and the services needed for status checking can be completely outsourced without loss of privacy and confidentiality of the citizen's records or loss of accountability of the logging server.
The next section gives an overview of related work. Section 3 introduces some preliminaries on the problem setting and the requirements imposed on our logging scheme. In section 4 we present our solution, more in particular we describe how to build, reconstruct and verify the authenticity of a privacy-friendly logging-trail. Conclusions and directions for future research are given in section 5.
Related work
As stated by Waters et al. [13] the general properties of a secure logging mechanism are integrity protection, access control and the availability of some functionality determined by the intended use of the logged data.
Integrity protection. If logs are to be used for auditing purposes, e.g., for post-factum detection of unauthorised actions, it is extremely important that a logged event cannot be altered or deleted without this being noticed. To enable this, Bellare and Yee [6] introduced the notion of epochs, time intervals in which log entries are authenticated under a (pseudo-randomly generated) symmetric key, unique for that interval. All entries logged in previous epochs are secure against modification if the key of the current epoch gets compromised.
The same idea of key evolution was used by Schneier and Kelsey [11, 12] . However, to deal with the detection of arbitrary deletion they include into each log entry an element in a hash chain and a MAC (see [10] for definition and examples) on that element. It is important to note that both [6] and [11, 12] assume that the machine that is creating or storing the log entries, will possibly be taken over by an adversary at some point in time.
A number of other papers is based on the solutions of Schneier and Kelsey. Accorsi [3, 5, 4] elaborates on the threat model and extends the scope to pervasive computing systems. Holt [9] introduces public-key primitives in his scheme and suggests message aggregation, i.e., authenticating a set of entries instead of each entry individually, to optimise the performance of his implementation. He also points out that it is sufficient to store only the verification value (MAC or signature) of the last element in the hash chain as this element implicitly authenticates all previous elements in the chain (cumulative verification).
Waters et al. [13] distinguish between trusted verifiability, enabling to share MAC keys with the verifier [11] , and public verifiability. A suggestion for the latter is checkpointing, i.e., publishing via a trusted third party, the hash value of the last log entry in the case of hash chaining, as used by Bergadano et al. [7] in combination with signatures and time-stamping.
Both [13] and [7] present their schemes in a symmetric and an asymmetric setting.
Access control. The content of the logged entries is often considered to be sensitive and is commonly protected by encryption. Schneier and Kelsey obtain selective disclosure of information by deriving individual decryption keys for individual entries and by adding to each entry a permission mask that allows to define roles and control access to the log entries. In [13] a trusted party, called the audit escrow agent, will decide whether an investigator or auditor is entitled to search for certain keywords in the log (see further) and to decrypt matching entries.
The scheme of Bergadano et al. [7] has more advanced features but limits access to a fixed set of auditors. Log entries are encrypted under a symmetric key that is again encrypted for each eligible auditor under his symmetric or asymmetric encryption key. Whoever logs the entry can define the subset of auditors that gets access. Encrypting dummy values for ineligible auditors prevents revelation of which auditor has access to a certain log line. Furthermore, they define a scheme for group auditing based on threshold schemes.
Usage of log data. In all the papers mentioned so far, the only required functionality of the log mechanisms is to be able to read the log entries. In [13] , apart from protecting the content of the log entries, it is also required that investigators could search for certain keywords in the log and read those entries that matched the keyword. One of the disadvantages of the approach is that the set of keywords cannot be expanded unless all entries are decrypted and scanned for the new keyword.
Originality. While our work also combines the ideas of encryption for confidentiality, hash chains and timestamping for public verifiability and signatures for accountability, we also introduce the concept of privacy-preserving reconstruction of processes, based on logged events that can be hosted by untrusted logging servers. In the next section we specify what is required from the logging scheme to enable this.
Processes

Definition
In the context of this paper, a process is a sequence of actions or tasks performed by one or more government administrations in order to achieve a certain goal, e.g., registration of a change of address. A process propagates through different administrations and can be described as a directed graph in which nodes are administrations and arrows indicate a certain progress in time. As such, a process can fork at several places and even cycles can occur.
In principle, we do not assume specific workflows for processes. Processes can run on dedicated servers, but can also happen in the analog (paper-based) world. This means that any process can be represented in our model. Note that in our model, administrations are trusted, especially to perform their assigned tasks in the process.
Logged events
For logging events, we assume that in processes a sequence of milestones and hand-overs can be defined such that the information that represents the status of a process is characterised by this sequence. Intuitively, this should be true for any process in eGovernment. In our view this does not impose any changes on existing process flows.
Milestones indicate that a certain status in a process has been reached, e.g., completion or failure of a subtask. They have an identifier that is linkable to documentation about what they represent, the process context in which they occur, and the ID of the handler, i.e. the government administration, of the process. Milestone instances contain an in-stance ID, a time-stamp and optionally some payload. How the instance ID is defined or what the semantic meaning of a certain milestone is, depends entirely on the administration that produced it and is irrelevant for our solution. We assume that the verifier is able to deduce the actual status from the milestones.
When a process leaves a handler to be continued by a different handler, hand-overs are used to indicate where the log data of the following steps in the process can be found, and what the new local (in the new handler) identifier is. Hand-overs are an extension of milestones. On top of the data in the milestone, they contain the location of the new logging server, the instance identifier of the new process and an additional time-stamp that confirms the reception by the new handler.
With the aid of the data on logging servers, it should be possible for a citizen to verify the status of a process by reconstructing the trail of logged events, i.e. milestones and hand-overs, and thus to know where his process is stuck and why.
Logging requirements
Administrations, or handlers, are responsible for logging milestones and hand-overs for all processes they handle. However, they cannot be obliged to log in a central place. Handlers can also set up their own logging servers, as long as they comply to the agreed specifications, such that logged events can be retrieved from them. To enable the outsourcing of logging, we assume that the content of the log is accessible by anyone. The logging server is free to log events from whatever administration he wants, but he may not be able to modify or delete them. Moreover, the logging server must provide a proof to the handler that he has received the handler's event.
The solution we present meets these requirements and achieves accountability. In addition, our scheme is privacyfriendly since colluding logging servers are not able to link their logging events for a certain process, when only the logged data is available.
The logged events create a trace of the original process passing through the different handlers. It can again be described as a graph that represents the original process, only this time the nodes are the logging servers and the edges are hidden. Only authorised entities are able to reconstruct these edges, by using an electronic mandate on the cryptographic keying material, used to protect the edges.
Logging scheme
In this section, we describe our logging scheme by an example. In our example, MR, A and B are handlers of processes, where MR is a special starting point (Mandate Repository) that can be used by the citizen to start processes and verify its status later on. L MR , L A and L B are the logging servers to which MR, A and B are logging the milestones of their processes. We chose to denote them separately, but in principle, they can all be the same, or they can consist of several logging servers. For example, A might want to log certain events to logging server L A 1 and others to logging server L A2 .
Building a privacy-friendly loggingtrail
The citizen starts a process at MR, which also acts as a front-end. The following steps illustrate how the logging events are entered into the logging servers (see figure 4 .1).
• MR generates a process identifier µ, which is recorded for (and maybe by) the citizen. It also generates an asymmetric keypair (PuK, PrK) to secure the logging events for this process, also to be kept for the citizen. This keypair must be process-specific, such that it can be used by others if necessary. The keys could also be generated by the citizen, but PuK must be known by MR, who will sign it, and pass it on to the other handlers.
Furthermore, MR calculates µ = H(µ) and µ = H(µ ) where H(x)
is a collision-free hash function. It also determines a random pointer p m , which connects µ to the logged data of the next step in the process. µ is the identifier of the process within the logging server L MR .
• (µ , p m ) is logged on the logging server L MR of MR.
• MR generates m = H(µ |p m ) and sends this value, as well as the PuK and L MR 's URI, alongside the process's normal data, to A, the first handler in the process chain. This value m will enable A to provide a citizen with a link to the logging server of A.
• When A receives m, it generates its own (random) internal process identifier α, together with α = H(α) and α = H(α ). Note that the application of H should be diversified for each handler.
• Now, A generates a log event in L MR that links the previous step in the process to the current one: it sends a (hand-over) couple (m , m A ) where
and E PuK (x) is a KEM-DEM hybrid cipher (see [2] ). Note that (m , m A ) cannot be linked to (µ , p m ) if µ is unknown. The URI indicates the location of the logging server on which A is going to log the events for process α.
• A performs the steps that are necessary to do its part of the process, and doing so, it logs events (milestones) related to these steps and lists them under α .
• In the depicted scenario, for completing the process, A calls B. For this, A generates a random pointer value: p a for B, calculates a = H(α |p a ), and sends that value, as well as the PuK and L A 's URI, to B. To L A , it sends the pair (α , p a ).
• When B receives the call from A, it behaves the same as A did: first, B generates its own process identifier, and then, sends the necessary linking information (hand-over) to the logging server of A.
Figure 1. Logging a process
We define µ, α and β to be the internal process identifier, while µ , α , β and µ , α , β are the first and second order local process identifier. Only the second order identifier is stored at and visible by the logging server, while the first order process identifier is only known by the handler that generates it and the citizen that owns the process. The internal process identifier is hashed only to have a uniform representation for the first order process identifier.
Reconstructing a trail
When a citizen wants to check the status of his process, he will only have to query the logging servers.
• The citizen has µ, so he can construct µ and µ
• He queries L MR for µ and retrieves p m .
• • Then, L A can be queried for all entries listed under α = H(α ). The citizen retrieves the (encrypted) Log Data about actions that A performed, and pointers p a .
• Pointer p a gives access to a B which can be decrypted to follow the link to L B .
Summarized:
Authenticity of logged events
With the construction above, not all of our goals are met: it is still possible for a malign logging server or an attacker to delete or change logged events, although targeted changes that establish faulty transitions (referring to the wrong logging server) are very difficult. It is still possible to enter dummy logged events (given that the logging server knows which public key to target).
In this paragraph, we try to protect the authenticity of the logged events, and establish some assurance that events are really logged, and that a logging server is communicating with a trusted handler. The authenticity requirements are:
1. The handler must be able to prove to the citizen that he has logged the substeps of the process for which the citizen is verifying the status. If L A falsely claims that a certain log entry does not exist, A can force the logging server to produce the entry anyway, or to admit that he did not follow the service agreement with A.
2. The logging server must prove towards the handler that he has stored the received logs. This must be shown in a commitment, supported by a service level agreement.
3. The logging server should preferably only log authenticated events, i.e., log entries coming from authenticated handlers. Even if the database with log events is polluted with unauthenticated log events, these should not influence the logging-trails of authenticated log entries. 1 4. The logging server should not be able to modify or delete authenticated log entries without this being noticed (forward integrity). Although the handlers are trusted, a logging server might log his own fake entries under a genuine process identifier, or allow other parties to do so.
4.3.1. Entity and data origin authentication towards the Logging Server. To enable (untrusted) logging servers to prove that they logged events from a trusted handler, we propose the following: First of all, the communication line between the handler and the logging server should be protected, e.g., by establishing an SSL/TLS connection with client and server authentication. This ensures an authenticated channel between them, for the duration of the transaction. The benefits are twofold: the handler knows that he is communicating with a genuine logging server, and that there is a high probability that his logging messages will be logged correctly. The logging server knows that he is communicating with a genuine handler that will pay for his service and that is likely to generate logging events that are useful for his clients.
After the transaction it cannot be proved that the data, sent over that communication line, really originated from the other end of the pipe. Therefore, the handler is obliged to send a signature every now and then (after a certain time interval or a certain number of logged events), over the items that were sent to the logging server since the previous signature. To this goal, the handler A keeps a record L Li of the logged -but yet to be signed -events that were sent to each logging server L i .
Note that it is not enough to claim that the handlers are trusted and that the logging server therefore knows that the logged events are genuine. Because the logging server itself is untrusted, he should be able to show the genuinity of the logged events.
4.3.2.
Data integrity and data origin authentication towards the handler. Although the handler is trusted, he should be able to show that he has sent some logging events to a certain logging server. This is necessary if a process gets stuck in an administration, or if the reconstruction of a logging-trail fails. In such a case, each entity in the eGovernment structure will want to be able to show that it really sent some logging events to a certain Logging Server, and that it's up to that server to reply with the appropriate entries.
To protect handlers against malign logging servers, for each logged event that a logging server is supposed to log, it will present a time-stamp response that embeds the hash value of the logged event in a time-stamp chain.
The party that issues such a time-stamp is referred to as a Time-Stamping Authority (TSA). It can be operated by the logging server itself or by another party. If the time-stamps are issued by another party, each logged event should be signed by the logging server before it is time-stamped, to explicitly link the logged event to the logging server. If the logging server also performs the role of the TSA, timestamp signature can be considered as his commitment to the logged event.
In our scheme, we use so-called linked time-stamps, already used in accountancy to prove the authenticity and timeliness of bookkeeping actions and in in notary services in general. An example of an efficient linked time-stamp scheme can be found in [8] .
When the TSA receives a hash value H i to be logged, it will link it to previous logged events H j , j < i, j ∈ S, with S a subset of all indexes of time-stamped events. The TSA computes H([{H j } j∈S |H i ]), adds some meta-data to it (serial number, time value), signs it and returns this as the result to the logging server, that forwards it to the handler. At reception, that handler should always verify the signature and the time-stamp.
After a certain number of time-stamps, the TSA will publish the current hash value to a widely witnessed medium. An example of such a medium could be the national Official Journal or a printed version of an established newspaper like the NY Times [1] . It also provides the entities that it serves with the necessary data to verify that all their events are accumulated into the published value. Later on, the logging server will have to be able to show all events that correspond to hash values, accumulated into published values.
This kind of time-stamping actually prevents tampering, once an intermediate value gets published. After that, changing, inserting or deleting a logged event will be equivalent to breaking the underlying hash mechanism.
Conclusions and future research
In this paper, we described a scheme for logging processes in a privacy-friendly and confidential way, that allows the subject of the process to verify the process status. Moreover, the logging-trail itself is protected against tam-pering by a time-stamping procedure. At the time of writing, a demonstrator for the scheme is finalised. The demonstrator is webservices-based and implemented in PHP with a C back-end. It offers a fully linked time-stamping server, a logging server, some dummy handlers, and a visualisation component at the client side.
The following topics could be investigated in future research:
• A formal threat analysis of the scheme could be conducted, e.g., to measure the level of privacy offered by the hand-over construction. Depending on the attacker model, traffic analysis could be a serious issue.
• The performance of the implementation should be tested, with specific attention for the overhead of the asymmetric key operations.
• It may be possible to replace asymmetric key operations by their symmetric counterparts, but this comes with a certain penalty. While not stated explicitly, the scheme that we propose is actually secure against a privacy breach by the trusted government administrations: they cannot retrieve process information using logged events, apart from the information they know by the processing of their part of the task.
